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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the structure of the Internet marketplace and the business relationships of key players
involved in network services provision. A brief overview of existing pricing policies and research work in
this area is presented and some new issues are introduced. We believe that the role of information
asymmetry is critical when considering agreements for Internet access and interconnection. In negotiation
and contract preparation, information asymmetry gives rise to adverse selection. The current structure of
connectivity agreements does not address information asymmetries thus allowing the possibility of
opportunistic behaviour in the form of moral hazard. Inasmuch as interconnection agreements involve
sharing and/or exchanging network resources, either party will tend to exploit the agreement to its own
advantage (i.e. conserving its own resources) and, possibly, to the detriment of the other (i.e. over-utilising
the other’s resources). The discussion focuses on interconnection agreements between Internet Service
Providers, namely peering and transit. The paper concludes with an outline of an incentive compatible
mechanism that can sustain quality of service requirements in interconnection agreements.

1.

INTRODUCTION

The Internet is structured hierarchically, comprising three main levels of participants, namely, end users,
Internet Service Providers (ISP) and Internet Backbone Providers (IBP). End users are at the bottom of the
hierarchy and access the Internet via ISPs. End users include residential and business customers. At the top
of the hierarchy, IBPs own high speed and high capacity networks to provide global access and
interconnectivity. They sell primarily wholesale Internet connectivity services to ISPs [Shriganesh, 1997].
ISPs then resell connectivity services or add value and sell new services to their customers. However, IBPs
may also get involved in ISP business activities by selling retail Internet connectivity services to
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end-users. Both IBPs and ISPs provide complementary inputs to the bundled network services that end-users
consume [Foros and Kind, 2000].
This hierarchical value chain for Internet connectivity involves two main kinds of pricing contracts. The first
involves pricing between end-user and ISP for primary Internet access and the second involves pricing
between ISP and IBP for interconnection. Thus, two markets for Internet connectivity are identified,
wholesale and retail, for global access and for connectivity to end-users respectively [Huston, 1999]. In the
early days when the Internet was an activity restricted to the public sector, mainly for research and education
purposes, access and interconnection were public goods and their provision was organized outside
competitive markets.
Internet provision and use today is primarily commercial, yet its basic architectures remain unchanged.
Internet connectivity in itself possesses public good properties, the most pervasive being network
externalities. The value for each individual participant, derived from the ‘network of networks’ increases
exponentially with broader reach and greater participation. Similarly, inefficient utilization of network
resources by one participant has detrimental effects on the quality of service received by others. Externalities
generate powerful incentives for interconnection while setting the stage for potential opportunistic
exploitation of shared network resources.
Another key characteristic of the Internet is its variety and heterogeneity. Diverse technologies, applications
and services inter-operate almost seamlessly, posing heterogeneous requirements for network resources.
Heterogeneous end-users have diverse expectations from the network and make use of various technologies,
applications and services. It is quite remarkable that such a complex commercial and technological
ecosystem seems to operate without major breakdowns and the whole world effectively relies on it for a wide
range of social and economic activities.
Having said all that, there are credible signs that the simple market mechanisms governing internet
connectivity are cracking under current pressures and may not be able to sustain future growth. In particular,
flat rate pricing for primary access is consistent with the cost structure of Internet service provision [MackieMason and Varian, 1995] but does little to control resource allocation under conditions of high demand
(congestion) and/or in the presence of differentiated user demands and willingness to pay. For example a
business user under pressure to complete a certain task may be willing to pay more in order to achieve higher
transfer rates. Current Internet architectures mainly support ‘best effort’ service and pricing schemes cannot
discriminate between users requiring high quality of service and casual web surfers. This problem is
exacerbated during periods of high traffic or congestion, when efficient resource allocation becomes an even
more pressing concern.
The problem is more complicated once we realize that even if we devise an efficient and practical
mechanism for resource allocation and price discrimination for primary access [Cremer et al. 1999], actual
performance depends on the conditions and behavior of several networks that mediate data transmission
throughout the world. In the past, ISPs have been agreeing to service each other’s traffic without charge, for
their obvious mutual benefit. However, competitive market dynamics have tilted the balance in such peering
agreements when, for example, one partner makes heavier use of another’s resources. Commercial wholesale
contracts, on the other hand, cannot always verify or enforce the agreed performance levels. For example, a
wholesale network provider may disguise his low effort (e.g. neglect to upgrade bottleneck network
components) as adverse system-wide demand conditions. An even more elementary problem is to agree upon
what constitutes performance, effort and cost and how that is built into an effective pricing scheme [Kende
and Oxman, 1999].
Information asymmetry is a key component of the problems sketched above. Participants in retail and
wholesale markets for Internet connectivity lack full information regarding each other’s capacity, demand,
resource allocation, effort and cost. [Cukier, 1998] As a result, they cannot enforce any contracts based on
performance (quality of service) and they have an incentive to act opportunistically against each other (to
take advantage of the other party’s poor information and deviate from agreed performance).
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This paper explores current practices and research work on access and interconnection agreements and
outlines future research directions for taking information asymmetry explicitly into account. It is structured
as follows. The next section reviews the literature on pricing retail Internet access in the presence of quality
of service (QoS) requirements. It explores the challenges faced, alternative solutions and their limitations.
We argue that even if these problems are resolved at the retail end, QoS cannot be guaranteed unless the
same requirements are propagated throughout the interconnectivity chain. Section 3 turns to interconnection
agreements between network providers. Current practices are discussed and their weaknesses are identified.
Section 4 explores in detail the nature, manifestations and implications of asymmetric information in
interconnection agreements. This section also sets out the requirements for sustainable QoS expectations
from such agreements. Before concluding the paper, section 5 outlines a modeling approach to characterizing
an incentive compatible mechanism for interconnection, satisfying such requirements.

2.

PRICING RETAIL INTERNET ACCESS

Much of the existing work on Internet access pricing adopts the view that prices should be used to achieve
efficient resource allocation. In this context, the proper objective function is some measure of user
satisfaction rather than cost parameters given ex-ante. Clearly, Internet access provision exhibits very low
marginal cost, much like any other information good. Therefore, it is not surprising that competition drives
actual prices to very low levels, even to nominal zero values [Jew and Nicholls, 1999] and that internet
access is often bundled with other information services (e.g. AOL) [Bakos and Brynjlofsson, 1997].
Consequently, pricing turns to consumer valuations as the basis for determining how much to charge. In the
presence of heterogeneous user preferences regarding quality of service (i.e. delay and packet loss), the
problem becomes a standard exercise in price discrimination. Using such models it is straightforward to
show that that properly computed short run prices could give information about the value of capacity, and
provide useful indications for network resource allocation. [Shriganesh, 1997]
Further, an important element in some models is that users should be charged in a way that reflects the
negative externalities they impose on others. Hence, if the capacity of the network is constrained, a user
should be charged for the fact that the packets he transmits increase congestion and therefore decrease the
utility of other users. If negative externalities are not charged for, information asymmetry (for example, the
fact that the ISP cannot know whether the user is a casual web surfer or an urgent business client) gives end
users an incentive to act opportunistically by ‘wasting’ network resources.
The Internet raises specific problems once one turns to the much more complex issue of implementing these
pricing schemes. One pricing problem is that a user would be made responsible for costs over which he has
very little control as they depend on total network capacity and the behavior of other users. There are two
issues here.
One is incomplete information about network capacity and demand patterns. Even if a user makes the effort
to collect relevant information from research reports, reputation or past experience, his information will
always be incomplete vis-à-vis the informed ISP who has perfect knowledge of both (even if demand is not
perfectly predictable). This information asymmetry can instigate ISP opportunism in the form of moral
hazard. For example, an ISP might oversubscribe its network in order to maximize profitability at the
detriment of customer service. Alternatively, with a pricing mechanism that charges for negative externality,
and given that actual demand is stochastic and unobservable by the user, the ISP might discriminate his
charges against certain customers in favor of more profitable ones.
The second issue relates to a degree of risk that the user may have to bear under such pricing mechanisms.
This risk involves receiving lower service quality for any given price or vice versa. Normally, in a principalagent setting we expect the risk-neutral party (in this case the ISP) to absorb the risk facing the risk-averse
party (in this case the end user). Inasmuch as the ISP also faces some risk from uncertain demand, this issue
is further confounded and the efficient outcome is not obvious.
The second pricing problem stems from the fact that the shadow prices of capacity vary over time, and it is
possible that in some parts of the network where capacity is specially limited and demand especially bursty,
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these shadow prices may vary very fast. This makes it very difficult to organize a pricing scheme that tracks
the correct shadow prices. Given that demand is stochastic and highly bursty, this problem can be pervasive.
From a practical perspective, the user cannot handle the overhead of adjusting his behavior to dynamic, real
time price variation.
In their proposal for ‘smart markets’, McKie-Mason and Varian [McKie-Mason and Varian, 1995, 1996,
1997], suggest the use of Vickrey auctions. In their implementation, each packet would carry a maximum
price that the sender is willing to pay for the service. The network would accept to forward packets carrying
a willingness to pay superior to a threshold computed in such away that the total number of packets that are
transmitted equals available capacity. Although this approach yields a theoretical first best outcome, it faces
obvious implementation obstacles (including, among others, network overheads and incompletely informed
users). Furthermore, one might raise questions regarding the equity and fairness of the method, since some
users may get served too late or never.
In a series of papers, Gupta, Stahl and Whinston [e.g. Gupta et al., 1997 and 2000] have proposed alternative
approaches for pricing Internet access dynamically. At every point of time the network is monitored for
congestion. The prices charged for the nodes at which congestion is severe are increased, whereas the prices
for nodes at which congestion is less severe are decreased. Each user of the network is informed dynamically
of the prices and can decide whether or not to send packets accordingly. The authors have carried out
simulated experiments to demonstrate that under broad conditions their algorithm tracks the equilibrium
prices well.
A key feature of the next generation Internet Protocol (IPv.6) is that it will support priority classes that data
packets will be assigned, in order to satisfy QoS requirements of the application (e.g. email vs.
videoconferencing) or of the user. This feature has been exploited in much of the research reviewed here. In
particular, Clark’s [Clark, 1995] basic proposal gives users the opportunity to buy `priority flags', which can
be attached to especially important packets. Priority classes can be used to implement a pricing mechanism
based on expected capacity. The main advantages are performance predictability for the user (even though
QoS may not be entirely guaranteed) and ease of implementation for the provider (no tracking of data).
Moreover, this analysis captures directly the fact that the marginal cost of traffic flow is non-zero only
during congestion and that prices remain flat during non-congested periods.
Dynamic pricing mechanisms are `spot market' proposals. Although hey have significant efficiency traits
[Edell and Varaiya, 1999], they have three main disadvantages. First, they are not suitable for applications
requiring continuous availability of bandwidth, where demand cannot adjust dynamically. Second, they may
pose significant information overheads to the network itself, which has to monitor traffic volumes on every
node and notify end users. Third, they raise informational overhead for the user and are disruptive to the
main service that the user seeks online.
Psychological experiments [Bouch and Sasse, 1999] have demonstrated the latter effect and elaborated on its
implications. In particular, it has been shown that users need predictable quality of service and real time
feedback for tasks demanding high performance, while more ‘casual’ or less urgent tasks do not demand
continuous feedback on network performance. Moreover, user willingness to pay is positively correlated
with predictability of and confidence in network performance. In other words, Internet access pricing should
not only reflect dynamic (spot) network conditions but also the overall, or long term quality of service, which
shapes subjective user expectations. Therefore, dynamic pricing mechanisms are limited not only because
they impose information overheads to the network and to the user but also because in the long run they turn
out to be less efficient than what current models anticipate.
This section discusses some approaches for service performance expectations of internet users. All these
approaches face a fundamental limitation, namely that solving the problem at the retail end is insufficient
unless the same requirements are propagated throughout the internet connectivity value chain. We now turn
the discussion to this matter.
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3.

PRICING WHOLESALE INTERNET ACCESS: INTERCONNECTION
AGREEMENTS

Interconnection is what makes the Internet “the network of networks”. The dominant economic driving force
for interconnection between network providers is positive network externalities. Externalities result from
connectivity [Baake and Wichmann, 1999], the possibility of every party connected to the Internet to be able
to communicate with any other party, and from universal access, the possibility to have access to all network
resources independently of the user’s physical location. Additionally, interoperability of heterogeneous
technologies and user applications requires extensive connectivity. Further, dense interconnection facilitates
packet routing though short paths and decreases the possibility of marginal loss, thus supporting the
provision of Quality of Service (QoS).
ISPs and IBPs aiming at exploiting the benefits of interconnection have been implementing two types of
agreements, namely peering and transit. As a result, the exchange of Internet traffic operates with two
parallel systems [Cukier, 1998]. Peering agreements involve the exchange of traffic between the users of two
networks free of charge. When ISP A peers with ISP B, traffic originates in A’s (B’s) network and terminate
in B’s (A’s) network. Transit payment agreements occur when a provider wants to reach customers of some
third party that the he doesn't peer with. In this case he enters into transit agreement with another
intermediary provider who is, in turn, interconnected to that part of the Internet. Neither peering or transit
agreements guarantee quality of service.
A peering agreement between two ISPs involves exchange occurring at public and private Internet exchange
points. Partners only exchange traffic between them, at the exchange point nearest to origination and
termination of transfer, on a settlement-free basis also known as sender-keeps-all. The only direct costs
involved are the purchase of equipment and the provision of transmission capacity needed for each partner to
meet the requirements deriving from peering. Figure 1 presents a simple representation of the main
connectivity arrangements described above.

Figure 1: Interconnectivity on the Internet
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Connectivity providers face conflicting incentives. On one hand, they have an incentive to cooperate with
one another in order to provide their customers with access to the full range of Internet users and content. On
the other hand, they have an incentive to compete with one another for both retail and wholesale customers.
The strategies and growth of individual networks vary significantly and this has led to some breakdowns in
the peering system. [Frieden, 1998] The exponential growth of the Internet has put enormous pressure on the
backbones and on the interconnection points connecting the backbones. [Cremer et al., 1999]. As a result,
performance is hampered at these points and peering often turns out to be inferior in terms of service quality.
The alternative to peering agreements is transit payment agreements. There are two main differences
between peering and transit. First, one partner pays another partner for interconnection and therefore
becomes a wholesale customer. The partner selling transit services will route traffic from the transit customer
to its own peering partners as well as to other customers [OECD, 1998]. Second, transit does not involve the
same service as peering and, therefore, refusing peering in favour of transit is not a means of charging for a
service that was otherwise provided free of charge. When regional ISPs pay for transit they benefit from the
infrastructure investments of national or global backbones without themselves having to make the same
investments. Transit gives an ISP access to the entire Internet, not just the customers of the peering partner,
thus the transit provider must either maintain peering arrangements with a number of other backbones or
must pay for transit from another backbone.
Many ISPs have adopted a hybrid approach to interconnection, peering with a number of ISPs and paying for
transit from one or more backbones in order to have access to those backbones they do not peer with [Kende
and Oxman, 1999]. Interconnection agreements are also influenced by the dynamic nature of the Internet,
which often leads to a form of arbitrage that is played behind the scenes by the different ISPs negotiating
new interconnection agreements. For example an IBP that provides connectivity to smaller ISPs must also
interconnect with other IBPs and act similarly to foreign exchange arbiters, as he seeks to extract revenue in
both directions. The resultant business environment is one characterised by a degree of fluidity. Many
network providers operate both as a client and as a provider [Huston 1999].

4.

IMPLICATIONS FROM INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN INTERNET
CONNECTIVITY MARKETS

As indicated in earlier sections, bilateral transactions in the market for Internet connectivity (wholesale or
retail) are characterised by severe information asymmetries [Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo, 1997].
Internet providers control all the information pertaining to the characteristics of their networks (e.g. capacity,
usage etc.) and may or may not disclose it to potential interconnection partners. From an economic
perspective, such information is critical for the structure and efficiency of interconnection agreements.
Current practices are often based on the subjective perceptions of the parties involved and may not be
optimal or sustainable because of asymmetrically available information.
Asymmetric information in current types of interconnection agreements gives rise to opportunistic behaviour
in different guises. The first is called “backbone free riding”. A national ISP has to build and maintain a
nation-wide network, connecting different regions, whereas a local ISP, concentrating on a single region
does not. If both ISPs agree to interconnect, the local ISP may use national ISP capacity to service traffic
between customers in distant regions. For example, when a customer of the regional ISP requests a web page
from a customer of the national backbone whose server is far away, the request will be carried through the
national ISP, from one region to the other and the response back. The national ISP may thus refuse to peer on
the grounds that it is bearing the expense for a national infrastructure that the regional ISP can exploit at no
cost. As a result, a number of ISPs include in their publicly stated peering policies that potential peer partners
should be willing and able to peer at a number of geographically dispersed locations [Ergas, 2000].
The second manifestation of opportunism is called “business stealing effect”. Interconnection naturally
lowers end user switching costs. End customers may switch network providers seeking better
price/performance ratios without losing connectivity or access to shared network resources. Lower switching
costs increase competition and, as a result, weaken ISP incentives to interconnect [Shapiro and Varian,
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1998]. An alternative strategy is to raise switching cost by differentiation. An ISP may bundle exclusive
services or content to its main Internet access offering in order to achieve customer lock-in (e.g. AOL).
Another example of perceived free riding that may arise in a peering relationship derives from the business
strategy of an ISP. One ISP may choose for a variety of reasons to focus on providing service to users that
generate high traffic volumes and use extensively the web servers of the peer ISP. In such cases the second
ISP will carry extra traffic volume that will negatively affect its network performance, and decrease the
quality of services provided to its own customers. If usage patterns are not reciprocal, peering is not
sustainable.Opportunistic behaviour may also arise in transit agreements. When an ISP signs a transit
agreement he is expecting to have global access to the Internet. It is, however, difficult to know the network
coverage of his provider and the performance levels of its network. As ISPs are trying to increase their
revenues through higher utilisation of their network, they often oversubscribe it. This behaviour in
combination with best effort service provision may end up to increased delays and packet losses for client
traffic. Thus, ISPs entering transit agreements do not always receive their expected benefits.
When ISP A is not able to identify the type of ISP B, with respect to certain characteristics that will affect
the outcome of an interconnection agreement, there is an adverse selection problem. The result might be that
desirable interconnections may not be agreed or that agreements may be settled under unfair or inefficient
conditions. The main information components that may be asymmetrically available to candidate
interconnection partners include, among others, the following.
•

The types of customers. Customer demand is notoriously unsystematic and difficult to predict.
However, an ISP can obtain demographic and usage characteristics (as indicators of demand patterns) of
its client base. Such information is not available to third parties.

•

The volume of traffic exchanged. This information is directly related to customer demand, which is not
predictable. However it is possible to simulate or estimate statistically demand patterns on the basis of
historical data [e.g. Gupta et al 2000].

•

Presence at peering points, other peering agreements and network management. Such information
concerns the business strategy of the ISP and its core competence. An ISP has no incentive to reveal this
type of information that will directly reveal the cost of managing its network.

•

Available capacity and resource allocation. This information includes decisions on statistical
multiplexing, overbooking, attracting new customers. Resource allocation has strong implications for
network performance.

Such information is critical during negotiations for peering or transit agreements. However, it is not readily
available and ISPs have little incentive to reveal it or report it truthfully. Current market practices address
this problem only in part. Large ISPs exert their bargaining power to extract such information from smaller
potential partners. The requirements and terms of such agreements are privately communicated and
undisclosed.
Information asymmetries are also manifest in the form of moral hazard after an interconnection agreement is
entered into. When ISP A is not able to observe or monitor the behaviour of ISP B after an interconnection
agreement, ISP B may alter its behaviour opportunistically for its own private benefit and to the detriment of
ISP A (or vice versa). Moral hazard arises as a result of actions such as the following.
•

An ISP may not keep upgrading his network capacity after an interconnection agreement. This will
result in poorer servicing of the partner’s traffic. As interconnection agreements currently are based on
best effort services, such behaviour cannot be verified.

•

An ISP may actively discriminate against IP packets that enter into his network from the interconnected
partner when its network has high traffic. In the context of best effort services it is almost impossible to
detect and verify such behaviour.
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•

An ISP may overbook its network in order to maximise economies of scale. To avoid congestion the
ISP may delay or not admit interconnected traffic. This not the predictable outcome under ‘naturally’
arising congestion but the result of intentional unilateral overbooking.

Moral hazard appears because one ISP’s profit maximisation strategy may not be aligned with the interests
of its interconnection partners and because he can hide or disguise his behaviour. The result is inefficient and
unstable agreements. Incentive compatible contracts can be devised so as to safeguard interconnection
agreements from opportunism and sustain the undeniable benefits of network externalities.

5.

PROPOSED RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

Both peering and transit agreements often do not provide sufficient economic incentives for partners to
collaborate on exploiting positive network externalities. New internet applications appear to be increasingly
demanding in terms of specific network performance guarantees. We argue that new types of interconnection
agreements based on contracts with incentive mechanisms, will mitigate the adverse implications of
asymmetric information and will provide a sound basis for sustaining quality of service requirements.
There are two main issues open to future research on interconnection agreements.
•

How can an interconnection customer ensure receiving fair treatment in a best effort service network?

•

What is the appropriate pricing scheme that will induce an interconnection provider to treat client traffic
with more than best effort services?

In order to apply the asymmetric information framework to the interconnection market, we identify the basic
parameters in the Internet context. These parameters are effort, outcome and cost.
The effort in this context can be defined as the ISP’s decision on how to treat the incoming traffic of a
customer. When customer traffic enters the provider network a decision is taken on the path it will follow
within it. This decision affects the quality of interconnection with respect to average delay and packet loss
rate. It is not observable by the customer, and the provider has no incentive to reveal it. The inability to
verify ISP effort can be alleviated by devising pricing mechanisms that provide suitable incentives to the ISP
to exert such effort as to ensure the expected performance. In effect, such mechanisms make the ISP
responsible for the effort he exerts by tying his payment to the outcome after accounting for uncertain
conditions.
We can assume that effort is defined in terms of the multiplexing algorithms applied by the ISP.
Multiplexing algorithms can be manipulated to give different priorities to different kinds of packets
according to subjective criteria. Such criteria may include, among others, the type of application being
serviced (e.g. email vs. videoconferencing), the identity of the sender (or recipient) or the revenue generated
by the traffic flow.
The outcome in the internet context can be defined by performance indicators such as average delay or
packet loss rates that are observable and provide quantitative measurements of interconnection quality.
The cost of interconnection can be defined by taking into account network management criteria adopted and
the multiplexing algorithms, selected by the ISP. An obvious definition of this cost is the opportunity cost of
not serving (or reducing the quality of service for) other customers. An alternative but equivalent definition
of this cost is in terms of negative externality (congestion) imposed on the network and its users. It is quite
difficult to estimate this cost as it depends on parameters that an ISP may not reveal. A key parameter is the
dynamic condition of the network, defined as the traffic load that is already in the network. This information
is available to the provider before deciding how to treat incoming traffic. In this setting, the cost of effort is
zero under some threshold traffic level and increases exponentially above that threshold. In turn, this
threshold depends on total available capacity and on the multiplexing algorithm.
To demonstrate a representative example, we assume that there are two networks A and B. Network B sells
backbone connectivity to A via a transit agreement. Further, we assume that a customer of network A wants
to set up videoconference with another party at a distant network. Videoconference packets will pass through
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network B. The application will generate revenue mainly to ISPA, who owns the customer who, in turn, will
be willing to pay more in order to ensure the desired frame rate. Network B has a key role in service
delivery. According to current types of interconnection agreements, ISPB will get no extra revenue and has
no incentive to provide better performance. How can ISPA induce ISPB to provide performance guarantees or
at least priority to its videoconference packets?
We consider a simple case with two effort levels. ISPB maintains two virtual links of equal capacity. The
average arrival rate is higher on the first link. Therefore the average delay rate will also be higher for packets
forwarded through the first link. The second link is reserved for priority packets, has lower arrival rate and
sustains lower delays. ISPA would like to induce ISPB to pass his packets through the priority link. However,
ISPA is not able to monitor or verify ISPB effort. ISPA will only observe the final outcome (delay or frame
rate), which is expected to be the weighted average of the two different delay rates. The cost of ISPB depends
on current traffic and on the extra delay that ISPA traffic will create on the specific link. This implies that
there is an opportunity cost for carrying ISPA traffic through the priority link. Both ISPs are maximising their
profits. ISPA prefers his traffic to go through the priority link whilst ISPB generally prefers to route traffic
through the low priority link that has lower opportunity cost. At this point the analysis is more
straightforward from the point of view of ISPB. The latter has to segment the market with such a price that
only customers, who really value priority service, receive it. The price must be tied to observed frame rates
while being higher than ISPB’s opportunity cost. The reality the problem is rather more complex because
ISPB’s opportunity cost depends on the total demand for the priority link at the given moment in time. In a
comprehensive model, the uncertainty regarding system-wide demand conditions and the risk preferences of
the parties must also be taken into account.
This is a sketch of a model that addresses the question of sustaining efficient interconnection agreements. It
suggests that mechanisms similar to those studied for retail Internet access can be applied to wholesale
markets. The aim is to propagate sufficient incentives throughout the connectivity value chain in order to
deliver performance expectations to end-users. Clearly, formal modelling is warranted to explore the
properties and behaviour of such mechanisms. Furthermore, multiple provider settings need to be modelled
before broader conclusions can be drawn.

6.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper analyses both retail and wholesale markets for internet connectivity, giving particular emphasis
on the latter. After a brief overview of extant pricing policies and related research we believe that the role of
information is critical when considering bilateral business relations in the Internet marketplace. Asymmetric
information in current types of interconnection agreements gives rise to opportunistic behaviour with
negative implications. Interconnection agreements exhibit great instability because of the difficulties in
enforcing them. Both peering and transit agreements do not provide sufficient incentives for partners to
collaborate on exploiting positive network externalities. Our research approach is aimed at addressing
adverse selection and moral hazard in interconnection agreements directly, with a view to devising incentive
mechanisms suitable for stable interconnection agreements sustaining specific performance expectations.
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